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NOTES
governmental activities. Such a condition no longer exists. The
government's immediate credit is unlimited: sounder than that
of any business. The government can well afford to delay the
collection of a tax until its constitutionality has been judicially
declared.
One step in the direction of disgarding the restrictions sur-
rounding tax refunds which have co-existed with the statutory
denial of injunctive relief, and which are based upon similar con-
siderations, is the abandonment of the requirement that a tax
be paid under protest if the taxpayer is ever to recover it back.
This change has been effected by an Act of Congress applicable
to internal revenue taxes generally.70
Time alone will reveal the effect and scope of the instant deci-
sion. It is noteworthy, however, that the meaning of an appar-
ently succinct and unambiguous statutory expression is, after a
judicial battle of 69 years, still in doubt.
WALTER FR=DMAN '37.
NEW LIMITATIONS ON THE POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE A. A. A. DECISION
The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of United
States v. Butler' held the Agricultural Adjustment Act2 uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that: a) it did not in reality provide
for a tax but for an exaction which was regulatory and b) the
expenditures in the act were made in such a way as to amount
to regulation of matters in which the sole regulatory powers
were reserved to the states.
The case arose in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Massachusetts under the title of Franklin Process
Co. v. Hoosac Mills Corporation.4 The receivers for the Hoosac
Mills Corporation presented a report recommending that a claim
of the United States for $81,694.28 representing accrued process-
ing taxes and flour taxes assessed pursuant to sections 9 and 16
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act' be dismissed. The District
Court refused to adopt the report and held that the claim should
be allowed. On appeal to the United States Circuit Court for the
70 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 1672-1673. Subsection (3) "Such suit or proceeding
may be maintained whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress." This provision was adopted June 6, 1932. 47
Stat. 286.1 (1936) 80 Law. Ed. Adv. Op. 287.
2 May 12, 1933, Chap. 25, 48 Stat. at L. 31, U. S. C. A. Tit 7 see. 601.
3 Supra, note 1.
4 (1934) 8 F. Supp. 552.
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First Circuit, this decree was reversed5 and the case came to
the Supreme Court on certiorari to review that judgment.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 19330 stated in section 1
that the purpose of Congress was to eliminate the disparity be-
tween the prices of agricultural products and of other products
in order to increase the purchasing power of the farmer. The
method by which this purpose was to be achieved was by estab-
lishing and maintaining such balance between agricultural pro-
duction and marketing conditions that the farmers would have
a purchasing power equal to that they enjoyed during the "basic
period" 7 Section 8 gave the Secretary of Agriculture the power
to make contracts for reductions in acreage of basic agricultural
commodities8 by means of "rental or benefit payments"; to enter
into marketing agreements with processors; to issue licenses per-
mitting processors and others to engage in handling in interstate
and foreign commerce the agricultural commodities covered by
the act or products thereof or competing commodities. Section
9a provided for the levying of processing taxes to obtain revenue
for the extraordinary expenses caused by the provisions of the
act, and provided that the tax should take effect when the Secre-
tary of Agriculture should determine that rental or benefit pay-
ments were to be made with respect to any basic agricultural
commodity. Section 9b fixed the tax at the difference between
the current exchange price and the fair exchange value to be
determined from the basic period. Section 12b made all taxes
collected available to the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out
the purposes of agricultural adjustment.84
The Secretary of Agriculture made cotton a basic commodity
in July, 1933, and calculated processing and floor taxes to be
effective at the beginning of the market year-August 1, 1933.
5(1925) 78 P. (2d) 1.
6 Supra, note 1.
7 August, 1909 to July, 1914 is declared by the act to be the basic period.8 Wheat, cotton, field corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk and its products
are declared "basic agricultural commodities" to which the act is to apply.8
' While the A. A. A. makes the funds derived from the taxes "available"
to the Secretary of Agricultural in such a way as to satisfy the court that
these taxes are to be used for that purpose alone, it would seem that a much
more definite provision in this regard could have been made. It is interesting
to note that there was no complete separation in the treasury, that there
were no provisions for the contracts made with the farmers to be paid only
out of these funds even if they proved insufficient, and that there were no
provisions for the funds derived hereunder not being used for other pur-
poses. It is also interesting to compare the provisions of the act with regard
to this point with those of the Social Security Act where an express trust
fund is created in the Treasury of the United States of the proceeds derived
from the tax provided in that act. (Aug. 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 640, U. S. C.,A.
Tit. 42 sec. 1104.) It would seem that the "expropriation" question dealt
with later on would be much more acute with regard to the latter legislation.
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The United States presented a claim to the respondents as re-
ceivers of the Hoosac Mills Corporation for processing and floor
taxes. The receivers refused to consider it a valid claim, and
the issues were formed.,
THE TAX QUESTION
The first question to be treated by the court was whether or
not the exaction could be considered a true tax. As has been
stated, the court decided that it was merely a device used in the
regulation of agricultural production. If the decision of this
question had been that it was a true tax,'10 the court would have
felt itself bound by the rule in Massachsetts v. Mellon" and
would necessarily have held that the respondents had no standing
in court. However, as the court held that it was not a true tax,
but a part of regulation, the rule of that case had no application,
and the respondents had a right to contest the validity of the
regulation.12 It is elementary, in this connection, that there are
the two types of taxes suggested in this decision. The first is
correctly designated a true tax and involves the exercise by the
taxing authority of the taxing power or the power to raise
revenue. The second type could be more properly called an
"exaction," and is one of the elements present in a plan of regu-
lation involving an exercise by the government of its police
power.'$ Thus, when a court holds an exaction to be merely a
device in regulation, it is essential to its validity that the body
adopting regulation have the power to so act.
In considering whether or not the exaction on processing was
a true tax, the court took into consideration several facts. In
the first place, the court felt that the avowed purpose of the act 5
was not to provide revenue for the government, but was to
restore the "purchasing power of agricultural products to a
parity with that prevailing in an earlier day; to take money
from the processors and bestow it upon the farmers who will
reduce their acreage for the accomplishment of the proposed
9 Note that the case arises under the original act and the amending act
of August 24, 1935 is of no effect. The citation of the amending act is
Public Acts No. 320. 74th Cong. 1st session. U. S. C. A. Tit. 7 sec. 602.
10 Which was one of the contentions of the dissenting opinion.
11 (1923) 262 U. S. 447-where it was held that neither a federal tax-
payer nor a state on behalf of federal taxpayers within its jurisdiction had
a sufficient interest in expenditures by the federal government to justify a
suit by it to question the validity of such expenditures.
1 Supra, note 1, 1. c. p. 291.
13 See: Morton v. Mayor, etc., of Macon (1900), 111 Ga. 162, 36 S. E. 627.
Child Labor Tax Case (1922) 259 U. S. 20; Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)
247 U. S. 251; United States v. Doremus (1919) 249 U. S. 86.
14 Ibid. See also: Packet Co. v. Keokuk (1877) 95 U. S. 80; Packet Co.
v. St. Louis (1879) 100 U. S. 423.
15 Supra, note 2, see sections 1 and 2 of the A. A. A.
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end-." 16 The court was further influenced by statements of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administrator to the effect that it (the
exaction) is "the heart of the law."'7 The provisions of the act
for the tax to go into effect when the Secretary of Agriculture
determines that rental or benefit payments shall be made; for
the tax to cease when such payments are stopped; and for the
basis of the tax to be the difference in purchasing power of the
farm commodity all affected the court's decision. However, there
seems small doubt that the element of the act most seriously
relied upon by the court was the provision for the entire revenue
derived by the tax to be reserved for the Secretary of Agriculture
in aid of the program described in the Agricultural Adjustment
Act itself. The court's own language most clearly explains its
emphasis on this point:
"It is inaccurate and misleading to speak of the exaction
from the processors prescribed by the challenged act as a
tax, or to say that as a tax it is subject to no infirmity. A
tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used
in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of
the government. The word has never been thought to con-
note the expropriation of money from one group for the
benefit of another. We may concede that the latter sort of
imposition is constitutional when imposed to effectuate regu-
lation of a matter in which both groups are interested and
in respect of which there is a power of legislative regula-
tion."'8
Instances of advance appropriation of funds in the same Act
which raises the revenue are rare and in reaching the conclusion
shown in that statement, the court relied on the Head Money
Cases0 as authority for its argument. In those cases, suits were
brought to recover money paid under an act of Congress 20 pro-
viding for a tax of fifty cents a head on aliens coming into any
United States port from a foreign port. The money was appro-
priated by the same act to constitute an Immigration Fund to
defray expenses of regulation of immigration. The question of
whether it was a true tax or not was not considered, since it
was conceded by both parties to be a matter of regulation.
The court felt that it was the only other case of which it had
16 Supra, note 1, 1. c. p. 291.
17 Supra, note 1, 1. c. p. 292.
1s Supra, note 1, 1. c. pp. 292 and 293. The court in making this statement
is using expropriation in a limited sense and means that the same act
provides for a tax on one group with benefits on another.
19 (1884) Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580.




cognizance in which there had been an appropriation in advance
to a particular fund embodied in the act that levied the tax, it
should be some authority for holding a similar act a matter of
regulation. This reasoning of the court seems a bit weak in view
of the importance of the decision; but it must be considered a
rule of law, since this case, that a reservation of the revenue from
an exaction to a specific fund in order to carry out purposes out-
lined in the same act is to be a basis for determining whether
or not the exaction is a true tax.2'
The other bases which have been used by the courts may
be discovered by a review of the cases in which the problem has
been dealt with. There seemingly has been no other definite
statement as to what would constitute an exercise of the taxing
power and what would constitute an exercise of the police power;
each case has been decided on its own facts. The court has varied
its attitude in dealing with these cases and has drawn fine dis-
tinctions. In cases involving the Narcotic Act,22 it has been
quite liberal in its construction. The first case to arise was that
of United States v. Jin Fuey Moy2 3 where the court upheld the
act as an exercise of the taxing power. The Narcotic Act pro-
vided for registration of the amounts of opium and its derivatives
which were in the possession of the person who had them for
sale, for records to be kept of the sales, the amounts sold, and
to whom sold, and for penalties for the violation of the provisions
of the Act. Jin Fuey Moy had in his possession some opium
which had not been registered as required by the act. In defense
to a prosecution by the government for violation of the Act, he
contended that the Act was unconstitutional as a regulation of
matters not within the powers of Congress. Mr. Justice Holmes,
in holding the act constitutional stated:
21 It would appear that in cases where state and county taxing power is
involved, the mere expropriation of money from one group to another does
not make the exaction a matter of regulation. Thus, taxes have been levied
on the state in general and appropriated by the same act to municipalities
for the purpose of building roads. However, in view of the loose language
and fact that exactions are called taxes even when involved in regulation,
it is not absolutely definite that the court did not mean tax in the sense of
a regulatory tax in these cases. See: 61 C. J. 125 and cases cited. Kinney
v. Astoria (1923), 108 Ore. 514, 217 P. 840; State v. Thayer (1897), 69
Minn. 170, 71 N. W. 931.
It is to be noted in this connection that if the majority in making this
statement was looking at the effect of the tax and appropriation, the state-
ment would not be justified as that is the effect of all taxes. However, it
is the belief of the writer that the court in making the statement was
referring not to the effect but to the form in which the appropriation and
tax were placed.
22 Dec. 17, 1914, c. 1; 38 Stat. 785. 789.
23(1916) 241 U. S. 394.
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"Only words from which there is no escape could warrant
the conclusion that Congress meant to strain its powers
almost if not quite to the breaking point ...in order to
make.., citizens who have opium in their possession crimi-
nal ... and subject to the severe punishment made possible
by Section 9. It may be assumed that the statute has a moral
end as well as revenue in view, but we are of the opinion
that the District Court in treating those ends as to be reached
only through a revenue measure and within the limits of a
revenue measure was right."
It is hard to reconcile that statement with the strict attitude
taken by the court in the present case. This liberal attitude was
continued in the case of United States v. Doremus24 That case
also arose under the Narcotic Act. The defendant, a doctor, was
indicted thereunder, and the District Court held the act uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it was an attempt by Congress to
exert a power not delegated to it but reserved to the states. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and held
that the act was constitutional. The Court stated that so long
as legislation has a reasonable relation to the taxing authority
conferred by the Federal Constitution upon Congress, it cannot
be invalidated because of the supposed motives that induced it
nor because the effect of the act may be to accomplish another
purpose as well as to raise revenue. The question as to the
validity of this act was again raised in the case of Linder v.
United States,25 which arose after the Child Labor Case'" in
which the stricter attitude began toi be displayed. In the Linder
case, there was a prosecution of a doctor for supplying a "dope"
addict with sufficient "dope" to satisfy her cravings without the
written order therefor, required by the Act. The court recog-
nized that it had held the same Act constitutional in the two
cases above; but it stated that its provisions must be limited to
the primary purpose of enforcing the tax, and that since the
doctor was acting within the field of professional conduct, the
law could have no application as Congress had no right to inter-
fere in that field.
Whatever was the cause for this change in attitude by the
Court, it has tended steadily since these early cases in the direc-
tion of construing the alleged exercise of the taxing power more
strictly than it had previously done. This fact is best illustrated
in the Child Labor Tax Caser6 and in the distinctions which the
court draws in that case when discussing the cases above and
other cases involving the point. In 1922, an act of Congress
24 (1919) 249 U. S. 86.
25 (1924) 268 U. S. 5.
26 (1922) 259 U. S. 20.
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levied a ten percent income tax on all business employing child
labor knowingly.27 The Court in considering the constitutionality
of the act had to consider the question of whether it was a true
tax or not. The Court stated the rule to be that where the legis-
lation was on its face an attempt to regulate and the tax element
was a mere incident thereto, it was to be considered a matter
of regulation and had to come within the regulatory powers of
Congress. The legislation in question was held to be a matter of
regulation on its face and an invasion of states' rights. The
Court relied on the element of scienter 28 which was made a
prerequisite for conviction of violating the act, and stated that
that element was more closely connected with penalties than it
was with taxes. The Court distinguished the case of Veazie
State Bank v. Fenno29 where it had been stated that the power
to tax may be exercised oppressively and that the responsibility
therefor was to the people and not to the courts, on the ground
that the tax in that case was merely excessive and there was
nothing on the face of the legislation to show that it was a
matter of regulation. The same basis was used to distinguish
the case of McCray v. United States" where an excise tax was
placed on oleomargarine when colored yellow; and from the case
of Fint v Stone Tracy Co.31 where an excise tax was placed on
the doing of business by corporations, joint stock associations,
etc., by Congress. The Court had a more difficult time distinguish-
ing the case of United States v. Doremus32 but did so on the
ground that in that case the court felt that the element of regu-
lation was reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax and
not solely to the regulation of a matter within the police power
of the states. The court relied, on the other hand, on the case of
Hill v. Wallace33 where the Future Trading Act 34 was held in-
valid as a matter of regulation within the reserved powers of
the states, and where it was clear on the face of the act that
regulation was the purpose. Thus, the court opened a way for
a new and less liberal construction of such legislation.
That the stricter view would be applied to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act was prophesied by the case of United States v.
Constantine" decided by the court a few months previous to
27 Feb. 24, 1919, c. 18; 40 Stat. 1057, 1138.
28 The act made it necessary for the employer to know that he was em-
ploying child labor.
29 (1869) 8 Wall. 533.
80 (1904) 195 U. S. 27.
31 (1911) 220 U. S. 107.
32 Supra, note 24.
33 (1922) 258 U. S. 44.
24 Aug. 24, 1921, c. 86, 42 Stat. 187.
35 (1935) 296 U. S. 287, 56 Sup. Ct. 223.
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United States v. Butler3' In that case, there was an indictment
for failure to pay an excise tax of $1,000 on persons carrying
on the liquor business contrary to the laws of any state or terri-
tory. The court held that the tax was a part of regulation and
that the act was unconstitutional.
"If in reality it is a penalty, it cannot be converted into a
tax by so naming it, and we must ascribe to it the character
disclosed by its purpose and obligations regardless of the
name. Disregarding the name of the exaction and viewing
its substance and application, we hold that it is a penalty
for the violation of a state law, and as such, beyond the
limits of the Federal power."3
From a review of these decisions, it is apparent that the fact
that the same act made the revenue collected available for cer-
tain purposes had never been used as a basis for holding the
exaction a device in a plan of regulation. There is little doubt
that the court would have been justified in holding the exaction
to be such a device without relying on this ground. The Act
was, by its stated purpose, an attempt to regulate agricultural
production in order to increase the purchasing power of the
farmer. Most of the provisions dealt with regulation, and the
tax was declared to be necessary to meet the extraordinary ex-
penses caused by the legislation.6 On the bases of the Child
Labor Tax Case36b and the rule that the court laid down in that
* case, this tax was a part of regulation as that purpose was clear
on its face and as the regulation was not merely incidental to
the collection of the tax as shown by the fact that it was collected
from an entirely different group. It is only to the latter extent
that "expropriation" as a .basis is connected with the prior
cases.3 8 In this instance, precedent without doubt was largely
reinforced by fear of the too great enlargement of the powers
of Congress by a liberal interpretation of this question and a
strict adherence to the rule in Massachusetts v. Mellon. 
35a Supra, note 1, 1. c. p. 295.
86 It is interesting to note that Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo dissented in
that case as well as in the present one. The theory behind the dissent was
that the mere fact that a business was illegal did not mean that the Federal
Government could not tax it-indeed it might even prove a more fertile
field of taxation and revenue than a legal business-and the tax was not to
be looked upon as granting a right to carry on the business in contravention
of state law. This shows the extremely liberal attitude taken by these three
Justices in questions of this character.
36' Supra, note 2, section 9.
3rb Supra, note 26.




While we have seen that the court had guide posts from the
past decisions to aid in the decision of whether the exaction was
a tax or not, the question of whether or not Congress had the
authority to appropriate as it did is strikingly barren of author-
ity.39 With the exception of dicta in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden4 0 to the effect that Congress is not empowered to tax
for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of
the states, both the majority and the dissenting opinions had to
rely upon statements of Hamilton and Story.40' The government
contended that even though the respondents were given a right
to contest the validity of the appropriation, the latter should be
upheld as authorized by Article I Section 8 of the Federal Con-
stitution which confers upon Congress the right to "lay and
collect taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States."'4 This contention would seem to make it neces-
sary for the court to decide whether the appropriation was for
the general welfare of the United States or not. However, as will
be seen, the court side-stepped the decision42 of this question
although it did construe the meaning of the clause. It was con-
ceded by the government that the phrase is used to qualify the
taxing power and grants no authority to provide for the general
welfare independently of the taxing power.
"The true construction undoubtedly is that the only thing
granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing
funds for the payment of the nation's debts and making
provisions for the general welfare." 43
as No consideration of the case of United States v. Butler would be com-
plete without a review of the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Stone in
which Mr. Justice Cardozo and Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred. With re-
gard to the tax question, these Justiceh were able to distinguish this case
from all preceding ones on the ground that in this case there was no
regulation effected through the means of the tax itself. While at first glance
this appears to be an able argument, it takes no account of the view that
the act cannot be separated into distinct parts but must be considered as a
whole, nor of the fact that while the tax may not effect a regulation, still
the appropriation does amount to a regulation, and the act appropriates
all the money derived from the tax to the aid of the appropriation-thus,
making the tax a step in the regulation.
39 It is to be remembered by the reader that the decision that the exaction
is not a true tax but is a device in the regulation of agricultural production
does not make the act invalid, but merely has the effect of giving the
respondents standing in court to contest the validity of the appropriation
and regulation.
40 (1824) 9 Wheat. 1 (199).
401 Supra, note 1.
41 U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8.
42 The court has never felt itself called upon to decide whether a particu-
lar appropriation was for the general welfare or not.
43 Supra, note 1, 1. c. p. 294.
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The court having decided upon an interpretation of the clause,
felt itself bound to take a stand on what the limitations were
on the power to authorize expenditure. It was a question of how
to construe the phrase "to provide for the general welfare of the
United States.144 The court points out that there have been two
general theories as to just what the limitations imposed by the
phrase constitute. Madison had felt that it amounted to a refer-
ence to the other powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses
of the same section, and that the taxing power and the power to
appropriate were, therefore, limited to those legislative fields in
which Congress had been delegated powers. The court refused
to adopt this strict view, and adopted the view of Hamilton and
Story; thus, coming to the conclusion that the power of Congress
to authorize expenditures is not limited to the direct grants of
legislative power found in the Constitution, although it is sub-ject to the limitation that it must be for the national, as dis-
tinguished from the local, welfare. It would seem that there was
no reason for the court to discuss all these points if it was not
going to decide the case on this ground. Since it refused to de-
cide the case on the basis of this provision and declared it was
not necessary for it to decide whether the appropriation was
for a matter of general welfare or not, it would seem that all
those statements were dicta. It is especially unfortunate that
the court concerned itself to such an extent with this point as the
man on the street has become convinced that it decided that
appropriations for the benefit of agriculture were not for the
general welfare, and much of the present objection to the theory
of judicial review is based upon that conviction. However, the
case was decided on entirely different grounds.4
The court decided that the act was, in effect, a regulation of
agricultural production, and as such, was an invasion of the
rights of the states. Under the 10th Amendment powers not
delegated to Congress nor prohibited by the Constitution to the
states are reserved to the states or to the people. The court
stated that: "None to regulate agricultural production is given,
and therefore, the legislation by Congress for that purpose is
forbidden."14" The broader power to tax was no aid in this case
as the tax had already been held to be a mere part of regulation,
and thus, there had to be a power to make the regulation. The
government's chief contention here was that the act was not an
44The question as to the construction in the last paragraph is as to the
taxing power and whether there were any limits on that power. The ques-
tion here arises as to the specific limitations present in the qualifying phrase.
45 This confusion comes from the fact that the court is dealing with the
appropriation in the part of the opinion which deals with unconstitutional
regulation.
46 Supra, note 1, 1. c. p. 296.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss2/9
NOTES
attempt to enforce regulation but was a mere matter of voluntary
cooperation. The court was of the opinion that the fact that
there was a material benefit to be derived only by making a
contract with the government amounted to economic coercion. 47
The court easily distinguished this case from others where con-
ditions had been imposed on appropriations on the ground that
in those cases there had been no standing in court to contest the
validity of the appropriations. 8 The ultimate conclusion is that
as Congress had not the power to regulate agricultural produc-
tion directly, it could not do so indirectly by means of purchasing
acquiescence and compliance with its desires.
Thus, appropriations to be paid only after there has been a
contract made by the government and other parties, binding the
latter to acquiesce in the wishes of Congress as expressed by
legislation, is held to be regulation. Does this mean that if it
were not for the rule in Massachusetts v. Mellon,49 the Federal
government could only appropriate money on condition where it
has the power to regulate?50 The court did not decide that appro-
priations on condition are constitutional, but merely holds that
so far no one has been able to contest them because of lack of
standing in court. It is not within the scope of this article to
decide whether such an attack could validly be made in the
future, and it is sufficient to say that, at present, there is no
apparent means of such an attack. The question naturally arises
as to why there should be such a limitation on the power to
appropriate if the true construction of this constitutional pro-
vision is that adopted by the court earlier in the decision. It
appears that the answer is to be found only in this: an appro-
priation may be made in such a manner that it amounts to a
47 It would appear from the statements of various farmers as to the
possibility of not complying with the act that the view of the majority of
the court was correct. The dissenting Justice felt that there was no coercion
as there was no threat of loss but merely a hope of gain. While there is no
available data on this point, it would appear that the distinction made by
the dissent was not warranted in practice.
'1 Supra, note 11.
49 Supra, note 11.
50 The dissenting Justices failed to see that there was an element of
regulation present and considered the case from the angle of the appro-
priation alone. The combination of the appropriation and the method of
payment thereunder did not in their minds make the matter one of regula-
tion. See supra, note 1, 1. c. 305--'If the expenditures .. ., etc."--where
the dissent points out the necessity for appropriations to be made on con-
dition. The dissenting Justices agree that the taxing power may not be
used to coerce action in matters left to state control, and hence, that neither
can the power to appropriate be so used. The difference between them on
this point is as to whether there was coercion present or not, and the ma-jority of the court would seem to have been justified in holding that there
was.
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regulation of the matters involved, and when it is so made, it is
to be governed by the limitations on the power to regulate. The
chief discord in the court was over this question and resulted
from a failure on the part of the dissenting Justices to discern
that the appropriation did amount to a regulation. The court
was justified in overlooking the mere name "appropriation" and
going to the essence of the effect of such provisions, but the case
could have been decided on other grounds had the court been
feeling in a more diplomatic instead of revengeful mood where
the new theories of economics were concerned."'
HENRY W. LUEDDE '36.
51 For the classification of the other grounds relied on by counsel for the
parties in this case, see supra, note 1, 1. c. p. 293 note. It would also be
advantageous to consider why such a strict view should be taken by the
court in light of the trends pointed out by Dean Isidor Loeb in "Constitu-
tional Interpretation in a Transitional Period," supra, p. 95.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss2/9
